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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a defendant is charged with bank robbery. A co-defendant, after
voluntarily submitting to an informal interview and being subsequently Mirandized,
waives his right to counsel and confesses to the robbery. Imagine also that this codefendant confessed not only to committing the robbery, but also to devising the
scheme behind the robbery, buying the masks and gloves, and everything else
necessary to carry out the robbery. The confession acknowledged a getaway driver,
implying it was the defendant, but the co-defendant never expressly named his
accomplice. There are no allegations that the co-defendant’s confession was
coerced, nor was the statement made in exchange for favorable treatment. The codefendant has since died, so a joint trial is not a possibility. Now, the government
wants to introduce the decedent’s voluntary confession incriminating the defendant
against the defendant at trial without giving the defendant a chance to cross-examine
him under the Sixth Amendment.
It is in these situations that a court must choose between two competing policies.
On the one hand, the Constitution gives accused criminal defendants the right to
cross-examine their accusers,2 because it is through cross-examination that a jury
will be able to decipher the truth by judging the credibility of a witness through
observation of the witness’ demeanor. On the other hand, if the witness is dead (or
unavailable), administering justice may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial
if cross-examination would add little, if anything, to the statements’ reliability. This
Article will explore why these types of confessions, called self-inculpatory
1

B.S., University of Nebraska at Omaha (1997); J.D., University of Kansas School of Law
(2000); Associate, Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C., Kansas City, Missouri.
2
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in a criminal
prosecution, the accused has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
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statements, should be admissible under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.
Out-of-court statements, “other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted” are
called hearsay.3 Ordinarily, the out-of-court statements of a non-testifying declarant
(usually a co-defendant) are excluded as hearsay because they are offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.4 The rule against hearsay reflects concern about the
trustworthiness of out-of-court statements because such statements are usually not
subject to cross-examination and are thus considered unreliable. Exceptions to the
hearsay rule permit courts to admit certain hearsay statements without crossexamination if those statements bear indicia of reliability and trustworthiness
sufficient to overcome these concerns.
One such exception is Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which provides that,
if the hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify as an in-court witness, the hearsay
rule does not exclude
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it
to be true . . ..5
The same reliability concerns underlie the Confrontation Clause. As noted
earlier, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment,6 provides that in a criminal prosecution,
the accused has the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”7 As the
Supreme Court has concluded:
[T]he particular vice that gave impetus to the confrontation claim was the
practice of trying defendants on ‘evidence’ which consisted solely of ex
parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining magistrates, thus
denying the defendant the opportunity to challenge his accuser in a faceto-face encounter in front of the trier of fact.8
By eliminating this abusive ex parte affidavit practice, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses “promotes reliability in criminal trials.”9
The right of confrontation requires that whenever possible, testimony and crossexamination should occur at trial.10 The purpose behind the Confrontation Clause is

3

FED. R. EVID. 801(c).

4

See e.g., United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1292 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180 (1st Cir. 1993).
5

FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).

6

See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).

7

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

8

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).

9

Lee v. Illnois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986).
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two-fold: (1) to allow a criminal defendant the right to confront his or her accusing
witness face-to-face in open court for truth-testing cross examinations; and (2) to
give the jury an opportunity to judge the credibility of the witness through
observation of the witness’ demeanor.11 Thus, “[t]he primary object [of the Clause
is] to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits. . . [from] being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness[es]”
against him12 when the accuser is available to testify. The purpose of this Article is
to suggest that if an unavailable accomplice’s confession meets the requirements of
FRE 804(b)(3), and thus is truly against the declarant’s interest, that statement is
sufficiently reliable to be admitted against the defendant as a firmly rooted hearsay
exception under the Confrontation Clause without the need for cross-examination.
When the prosecution offers hearsay evidence against the accused in a criminal
case, the question as to whether admission of that evidence would violate the
Confrontation Clause is triggered.13 If courts enforced the Confrontation Clause
literally, they would exclude from evidence any hearsay statement made by a
declarant who was not present or who did not testify at trial.14 Thus, if the declarant
has died before trial, as in the hypothetical posited at the beginning of this Article,
his statement is automatically excluded from evidence simply because the defendant
will never be able to face him in court. Accordingly, a literal application of the
Confrontation Clause would abrogate any need for the hearsay rule and its
exceptions in criminal cases.15 The Supreme Court has recognized that such a result
is “unintended and too extreme.”16 To avoid this result, the Supreme Court
established in Ohio v. Roberts17 a general approach for determining when hearsay
statements incriminating the defendant are admissible under the Confrontation
Clause.
Part IIA of this Article will discuss the two-part test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts.
Part IIB will address Lilly v. Virginia, the Supreme Court’s first attempt to resolve
whether statements against penal interest are sufficiently reliable to be admissible
under the Confrontation Clause. Part IIB will also explore the distinction between
self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory statements, what constitutes a “firmly
rooted” hearsay exception, and also the policy concerns behind creating a “firmly
rooted” hearsay exception. Part III will then conclude why statements against penal
interest qualify as a firmly rooted hearsay exception under the first prong of the
Roberts test, and thus warrant dispensing with cross-examination.

10

See JOHN L. CONLON & MARK A. DOMBROFF, TRIAL HEARSAY: OBJECTIONS &
EXCEPTIONS, § 3.410 (2d ed. 1996).
11

See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).

12

Id. at 242.

13

See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 413-14 (1985).

14

See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.

15

See CONLON & DOMBROFF, supra note 10, at § 3.310.

16

See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 63 (1980)).
17

448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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II. THE TWO-PART TEST
A. Ohio v. Roberts
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court established the criteria necessary to admit
a hearsay statement over a Confrontation Clause objection. An out-of-court
statement is admissible under the Confrontation Clause if the statement bears
adequate “indicia of reliability” to justify the absence of cross-examination of the
declarant.18
The Court in Roberts created a two-part test to determine if a statement bears
adequate indicia of reliability.19 Under the first prong of the test, a hearsay statement
that falls within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” is sufficiently reliable to be
admitted without cross-examination.20 The phrase “firmly rooted” is a very
ambiguous concept in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as there has been no
definitive test for what constitutes a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception. In the
alternative, under the second prong of the test, a hearsay statement is admitted under
the Confrontation Clause if it has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” such
that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statements’
reliability.21 Therefore, if the statement meets a firmly rooted hearsay exception or
has “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” it bears adequate indicia of
reliability and thus admission of the statement is proper without requiring the
declarant to testify at trial. This Article will explore why the statements against
penal interest hearsay exception is sufficiently reliable as a firmly rooted hearsay
exception for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The first Supreme Court case to
address statements against penal interest as a firmly rooted hearsay exception under
the first prong of the Roberts test was Lilly v. Virginia.22
B. Lilly v. Virginia
In Lilly v. Virginia, three men―the defendant Benjamin Lee Lilly, his brother
Mark, and another cohort were arrested after a crime spree involving robberies, a
carjacking, and a murder.23 In a custodial confession, Mark admitted stealing
alcoholic beverages but expressly stated that it was Lilly who masterminded the
robberies, instigated the carjacking, and was the shooter in the murder.24 Mark
acknowledged he was present at the murder, but continually emphasized that he was
18

Id. at 65-66 (quoting Monevsi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).

19
When the challenged out-of-court statement was made in the course of a prior judicial
proceeding, as a preliminary matter, the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the
unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the Defendant. See
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. In all other
circumstances, an unavailability analysis is an unnecessary part of the Confrontation Clause
inquiry. See White, 502 U.S. at 354.
20

See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

21

Id.

22

527 U.S. 116 (1999).

23

See id. at 120.

24

See id.
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drinking heavily during the entire spree and “didn’t have nothing to do with the
shooting.”25 In addition, “the police told Mark that he would be charged with armed
robbery, and, . . . unless he broke ‘family ties,’” he may have to serve a life sentence
for his role in the crime.26
When the Commonwealth of Virginia called Mark as a witness at Lilly’s criminal
trial, Mark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
was unavailable to testify.27 The Commonwealth offered all of Mark’s statements
including the admission of stealing alcoholic beverages, that Lilly was the
mastermind and the shooter, and that Mark was drinking heavily and had nothing to
do with the shooting.28 The defense “objected on the ground that the statements were
not actually against Mark’s penal interest because they shifted” blame for the crimes
to the defendant and thus violated the Confrontation Clause.29 Since Mark’s
confession implicated himself in the crime spree and exposed him to criminal
liability and jail, the trial court admitted the entire confession over the Confrontation
Clause objection.30 This confession demonstrates the concept of against penal
interest. As a result, the defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes.31
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in holding “that Mark’s
statements were declarations of an unavailable witness against penal interest;” the
reliability of the statements was established by other evidence; and all statements
against penal interest, whether they shift blame or not, fall within a “firmly rooted
exception” to the Virginia hearsay rule satisfying the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause.32
The Virginia Supreme Court went on to note that to the extent Mark’s statements
were self-serving, in that they shifted blame to the defendant, goes to the weight and
not the admissibility of the evidence.33 Thus, the Virginia hearsay rule at issue in
Lilly admits all statements that contain some declaration against penal interest. In
contrast, Federal Rule 804(b)(3) prohibits the admission of non-self-inculpatory
statements.34 Furthermore, because the Virginia Supreme Court held that Mark’s
statements were reliable per a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the statements were
admissible under the first prong of the Roberts test. Therefore, the court did not need

25

Id.

26

See id.

27

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121.

28

See id. 121-22.

29

See id.

30

See id. at 122.

31

See id.

32

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 122.

33

See id.

34

See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994) (“[T]he most faithful
reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory
statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally selfinculpatory”).
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to address whether those statements also possessed particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness under the second prong of the Roberts test.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, with a 4 - 3 - 1 - 1 plurality noting
that “non-self-inculpatory” statements, such as Mark’s, are presumptive unreliable.35
Further, the plurality concluded that all accomplice confessions that inculpate a
criminal defendant (like Mark’s) do not fall within a “firmly rooted” exception to the
hearsay rule.36 To understand what the Supreme Court was trying to accomplish in
Lilly, it is helpful to look at the opinion in three contexts: the distinction between
self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory statements; what constitutes a “firmly
rooted” hearsay exception; and the policy concerns behind creating a “firmly rooted”
hearsay exception such that dispensing with cross-examination is warranted.
1. Self-Inculpatory v. Non-Self-Inculpatory Statements
The Lilly plurality, consisting of Justices’ Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
was primarily troubled that the statements against penal interest exception
“encompasses statements that are inherently unreliable,” such as the custodial
confession in Lilly where the accomplice was shifting the blame to the defendant.37
As a result, statements against penal interest cannot be admitted as a “firmly rooted”
hearsay exception according to the plurality.38
The Court notes that ‘declaration against penal interest’ “defines too large a class
for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis.”39 In an attempt to categorize such
statements, the plurality offered three situations where statements against penal
interest are used in criminal trials: “(1) as voluntary admissions against the
declarant; (2) as exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant who claims that the
declarant committed, or was involved in, the offense; and (3) as evidence offered by
the prosecution to establish the guilt of an alleged accomplice of the declarant.”40
The first category of statements are admissible against the declarant if the
declarant himself is on trial. For example, if Mark Lilly himself were on trial for
stealing alcoholic beverages, his statements would unquestionably be admissible
against him.41 This is the same as an admission by a party opponent, a statement that
is not hearsay.42
If, however, the declarant was a codefendant in a joint trial, then the admission of
a statement against penal interest may result in a Bruton violation. Where a
confession by a non-testifying codefendant is admitted, the defendant inculpated by
the statement is denied the opportunity to cross-examine his codefendant, thus
leaving the reliability of the statement untested. This is termed a Bruton violation

35

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133.

36

Id. at 134 n.5.

37

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 127 (citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 544 n.5 (1986)).

40

See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127.

41

See id.

42

See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
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after the case of Bruton v. United States.43 Under Bruton, the prosecution cannot
offer in a joint trial the nontestifying codefendant’s confession naming the accused
as a participant in the crime, even if the jury is instructed to consider that confession
only against the codefendant.44
Bruton is problematic only in joint trials. Even in a joint trial, however, a Bruton
violation only occurs if the codefendant’s statement directly implicates the
defendant.45 Where the reference to the defendant is only indirect (i.e. merely
acknowledging the existence of a getaway driver), and the jury can only complete
the inference by relying on other evidence at trial, Bruton does not apply.46
The second category of statements against penal interest are, by definition,
offered by the accused, not the prosecution. Thus, the admission of such statements
does not involve Confrontation Clause concerns and there is no need to decide if
these statements constitute a firmly rooted hearsay exception under Roberts.47
It is this third category of statements, including statements “by an accomplice
which incriminates a criminal defendant,”48 that have divided the Courts of Appeals
and district courts as to whether such statements are reliable enough to constitute a
firmly rooted hearsay exception.49
The Supreme Court has consistently held that a codefendant’s confession is
“presumptively unreliable” when it implicates the defendant because those
statements “may well be the product of the codefendant’s desire to shift or spread
blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another.”50 These types of
statements are also known as “non-self-inculpatory statements.” A “non-selfinculpatory statement” is a statement where an accomplice minimizes his own
criminal responsibility and shifts blame to the defendant.51 Thus, non-selfinculpatory statements are not statement’s against the declarant’s penal interest.

43

391 U.S. 123 (1968).

44

See id.

45

See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987).

46

See United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1083 (5th Cir. 1997).

47

See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 130.

48

Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 n.5.

49

See e.g., United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1302 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[Where] it is
clear that the statements inculpating both the declarant and the defendant were not made in
order to limit the declarant’s exposure to liability, the declarations against interest exception is
properly treated as firmly rooted for Confrontation Clause purposes”); Neuman v. Rivers, 125
F.3d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir. 1997) (declaration against penal interest exception is firmly
rooted); United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1363 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v.
Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 670 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 126869 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating in dicta that declaration against penal interest exception is firmly
rooted). But see United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770, 775-76 (5th Cir. 1993) (not firmly
rooted); Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 1996) (same). The rest of the
circuits have declined to address the issue.
50

Lee, 476 U.S. at 545.

51

See United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Mark Lilly’s confession is a non-self-inculpatory statement. Mark’s statement
completely minimized his own criminal responsibility. In effect, Mark said, “I stole
some alcoholic beverages. But Ben Lilly masterminded the robberies. Ben
instigated the carjacking. Ben shot [DeFilippis]. I was there, but I was drinking
heavily and had nothing to do with these crimes.”52 Nowhere in this statement does
Mark accept responsibility for the crimes other than to admit stealing alcoholic
beverages. His entire statement directly implicates and shifts all of the blame to Ben.
As a result, Mark’s inherently unreliable statement was a violation of Lilly’s right
to confrontation, and furthermore, did not constitute a firmly rooted hearsay
exception under Roberts. The resulting violation was unanimous among the nine
Justices in Lilly. In fact, Justice Scalia even termed the result a “paradigmatic
Confrontation Clause violation.”53 However, the reasoning behind the plurality’s
opinion as to whether such a statement qualifies as a firmly rooted hearsay exception
was sharply disagreed with by the five concurring Justices.
The concurrence of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy, conclude that there was a violation, but found the plurality’s attempt at
classifying the types of statements against penal interest to be “unwarranted and
results[ing] in a complete ban on the government’s use of accomplice confessions
that inculpate a codefendant.”54 The Chief Justice went on to note that holding all
such accomplice confessions inculpating a criminal defendant inadmissible was
inappropriate in Lilly because part of the accomplice’s confession was simply not
even a statement against penal interest within the meaning of Rule 804(b)(3).55 As a
result, the plurality was not confronted with the issue of whether an accomplice
statement that is genuinely self-inculpatory that also indirectly inculpates a
codefendant is admissible under the Confrontation Clause. The Chief Justice did not
foreclose on the possibility that such truly self-inculpatory statements are admissible
as firmly rooted hearsay exceptions; he even suggested they should be admissible.56
Justices Thomas and Scalia also were not willing to follow the plurality’s approach
that the Confrontation Clause imposes a “blanket ban on the government’s use of
accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant.”57 Justices Thomas and Scalia,
although somewhat vague in their respective concurrences in Lilly, arguably
subscribe to the view that genuinely self-inculpatory accomplice statements may be
admissible as a firmly rooted hearsay exception.58

52

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120-21.

53

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring).

54

Id. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

55

See id.

56

See id. at 144-49.

57

See id. at 143.

58

See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 619-20 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring,
joined by Thomas, J.) (focusing on whether the custodial confession was truly self-inculpatory
or motivated by a desire to curry favor with authorities); see also id. at 603 (Scalia, J., joining
in Part II-A of the majority’s or Justice O’Connor’s opinion) (which stated “[e]ven the
confessions of arrested accomplices may be admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory.”)
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As the Chief Justice’s concurrence suggests, many confessions that inculpate a
defendant are, however, genuinely self-inculpatory because the declarant may not
minimize his role in the crime nor shift blame to the defendant.59 It is these
genuinely self-inculpatory statements that are inherently reliable. Compare Mark’s
statement with the hypothetical confession given at the beginning of the Article. The
hypothetical declarant confessed to the main role in the crime, took responsibility for
devising the scheme, and for almost all other actions associated with the crime. He
never once mentioned his accomplice. The only thing the declarant said to implicate
the defendant was to acknowledge that he had a getaway driver. This only indirectly
implicated the defendant. The declarant never attempted to shift the blame for the
crime in any way. This is an example of a self-inculpatory statement. This is the
type of statement that is trustworthy, and should be admitted against the defendant
under the Confrontation Clause as a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
Even the Supreme Court, in Dutton v. Evans,60 noted that the admission of an
accomplice’s spontaneous comment that indirectly inculpated the defendant did not
violate the Confrontation Clause. The majority emphasized that the coconspirator
spontaneously made the statement and “had no apparent reason to lie.”61 Similarly,
accomplices that give self-inculpatory statements have no reason to lie, and thus their
statements should qualify as a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
Other courts have followed this view. For example, in United States v. York,62
the Seventh Circuit recognized that the reason why accomplice confessions
incriminating a defendant are unreliable “stems largely from the presumption that
such statements are self-serving, offered only to shift the blame from the declarant to
another. But when . . . the declarant has not attempted to diminish his own role,
there is little reason to suspect that portion of an otherwise reliable statement is
untrustworthy.” Thus, confessing to the main role in the crime, whether it be
murdering someone or robbing a bank, demonstrates reliability of the statement.
Accordingly, the genuinely self-inculpatory statement in York was held to be a firmly
rooted exception to hearsay.63
Similarly, the Supreme Court recognized in Williamson v. United States,64 that
there are many circumstances in which Rule 804(b)(3) does allow the admission of
statements that inculpate a criminal defendant. Such statements may be admissible
“if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely attempts to shift blame or curry
favor.”65 A statement that meets Rule 804(b)(3) is sufficiently against the declarant’s
penal interest that a reasonable person would not have made the statement unless
believing it to be true.66 This can only be determined from the surrounding

59

See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 142-49.

60

400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).

61

Id. at 86-89.

62

933 F.2d 1343, 1363 (7th Cir. 1991).

63

Id. at 1362.

64

512 U.S. 594, 603 (1994).

65

Id.

66

See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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circumstances. Non-self-inculpatory statements are simply not against a declarant’s
penal interest because the declarant is trying to shift the blame, not to inculpate
himself.
As demonstrated in the hypothetical confession, self-inculpatory statements are
typically voluntary, spontaneous, and not given in exchange for leniency or special
treatment. This is because these factors alleviate the dangers that are present with a
statement that attempts to shift blame.67 The Lilly plurality failed to make a
distinction between self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory statements. The Court
was not confronted with a genuinely self-inculpatory accomplice statement that also
inculpates a codefendant, yet in effect, it imposed a “blanket ban” on the
admissibility of “all accomplice statements that incriminate a criminal defendant” as
a firmly rooted hearsay exception. The danger in the Court’s opinion is clearly that
statements that truly are against the declarant’s penal interest will not be admissible
against the defendant. This surely cannot be what Congress intended when it
codified Rule 804(b)(3). Statements that are truly self-inculpatory, those statements
that meet FRE 804(b)(3), are not made in an attempt to curry favor or shift blame to
the defendant.
The concept of a “statement against one’s penal interest” should make intuitive
sense. If there is no offer of leniency, and if a person does not shift the blame to
another in an attempt to appear less culpable, the person would not make the
statement exposing himself to jail unless he believed the statement to be true. There
is no reason for people to make statements that could send them to jail unless they
are getting a little “something” in return.
As a result, the plurality’s opinion in Lilly should be limited to cases of non-selfinculpatory statements, and it should not apply to cases involving genuinely selfinculpatory statements because such statements do not produce the same dangers and
concerns as a blame shifting statement, namely, a motivation to lie.
In contrast to the Virginia state law hearsay exception, Federal Rule 804(b)(3)
itself prohibits the admission of such non-self-inculpatory statements that name and
shift blame to another.68 Consequently, if a court was presented with a genuinely
self-inculpatory statement (i.e. the hypothetical confession), Lilly does not foreclose
the possibility that Rule 804(b)(3) qualifies as a firmly rooted hearsay exception
under the first prong of Roberts. So, then, what exactly constitutes a “firmly rooted
hearsay exception?” The next section will attempt to address that ambiguous
concept.
2. What is “Firmly Rooted”?
As previously noted, under the first prong of the Roberts test, a hearsay statement
that meets a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception is admissible under the Confrontation
Clause against the defendant because reliability can be inferred, without more, from
such a statement.69 While there is no definitive test for what constitutes a “firmly
rooted” hearsay exception, the Lilly plurality emphasized that a hearsay exception is
“firmly rooted” if in light of “longstanding judicial and legislative experience,” it
67

See e.g., Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 (finding that a spontaneous statement against the
declarant’s penal interest does not create motivation to lie), see also Lilly, 527 U.S. at 142-49.
68

See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121-22.

69

See White, 502 U.S. at 346; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
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“rest[s] [on] such [a] solid foundatio[n] that admission of virtually any evidence
within [it] comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’”70 In other
words, established practice of the hearsay exception must confirm that statements
falling within that exception are inherently credible and are the equivalent of those
statements required by the Constitution’s preference for cross-examination.71
According to the plurality, the statements against penal interest exception does
not meet this standard because the exception is “of quite recent vintage,” and
because the statements “function similarly to those used in the ancient ex parte
affidavit system” when offered in the absence of the declarant.72
The danger in the plurality’s opinion, however, is that the opinion is inconsistent
with prior majority Court rationale. According to the Supreme Court, a hearsay
exception may be firmly rooted when the exception is recognized in the Federal
Rules of Evidence and in a significant majority of the States.73 For example, the
exception for spontaneous declarations “is at least two centuries old, . . . is currently
recognized under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2), and [is currently recognized] in
nearly four-fifths of the States.”74
Similarly, the exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment is “recognized in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), and is equally widely
accepted among the States.”75 The exception for statements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment is, however, “of much more recent vintage, and to a
large extent it was created by, rather than merely recognized in, Rule 803(4).”76 In
other words, longstanding judicial and legislative experience suggests that even
relatively new exceptions can be firmly rooted if they are codified in the Federal
Rules of Evidence and widely accepted in the States.
Unfortunately, the Lilly plurality did not explicitly state exactly how many years
it takes before a hearsay exception is eligible for “firmly rooted” status.
Furthermore, the Lilly plurality is misleading to the extent that it holds that the
statements against penal interest exception is not based on longstanding judicial and
legislative experience. The Lilly plurality failed to recognize that the concept of
‘statements against interest’ dates back to the common law. Although the interest
had to be pecuniary or proprietary, that view has now been fully discredited.
Moreover, the statements against penal interest hearsay exception has been codified
in the Federal Rules of Evidence as Rule 804(b)(3) since the Rules were enacted in
1975. In addition, almost four-fifths of the States accept a statement against penal
interest hearsay exception in their respective State evidence rules.77 As a result, Rule
70

527 U.S. at 126 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).

71

527 U.S. at 126; see also White, 502 U.S. at 356.

72

See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131; see also Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242.

73

See White, 502 U.S. at 356.

74

Id. at 356 n.8.

75

Id.

76

Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1019 (1998).
77
The presence of the statement against penal interest exception in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, as the Rules were originally promulgated, in and of itself indicates widespread
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804(b)(3) can also be supported by longstanding judicial and legislative experience.
This suggests the Supreme Court should reevaluate Lilly with an eye toward
acceptance of Rule 804(b)(3) as a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception. The next
section will explore why it is good policy to recognize Rule 804(b)(3) as a firmly
rooted hearsay exception.
3. Policy Concerns Behind Firmly Rooted Hearsay Exceptions
As noted in Part IIA of this Article, if a statement does not qualify as a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, the statement is excluded under the Confrontation Clause
unless it bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under the second prong
of the Roberts test.78 The second prong of the Roberts test requires courts to
determine, based on the surrounding circumstances, whether the proffered out-ofcourt statement bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.79 This is a fact
driven issue that the Lilly court determined was subject to a de novo review.80 As a
result, not only are a trial court’s resources consumed, but also the appellate courts
resources are substantially depleted. Judicial economy is not promoted by this
“duplicative review”81 of whether a hearsay statement possesses particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.
By establishing firmly rooted exceptions to hearsay, courts are able to satisfy “the
need for certainty in the workaday world of conducting criminal trials” because such
exceptions do not require an unnecessary, extensive inquiry into the reliability of the
statement.82 Under a firmly rooted exception, reliability is inferred, and the second
prong of the Roberts test is avoided.83
The Lilly plurality voiced genuine concerns about ensuring the reliability of
statements admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception.84 As the Lilly plurality
properly concluded, statements made by an accomplice that directly implicate a
defendant and shift blame to the defendant are not inherently reliable.85 But those
statements are not “declarations against penal interest” as referred to in Rule
804(b)(3). As demonstrated above, statements against penal interest that are
genuinely self-inculpatory are sufficiently reliable to be firmly rooted. Further,
establishing this clear rule will simplify Confrontation Clause analysis in lower
courts and will also conserve valuable judicial resources.
Public policy also dictates against imposition of a “blanket ban” on the use of an
accomplice’s statement against penal interest inculpating a defendant. As Justice
acceptance because the Rules have been closely adopted in about forty states. Friedman,
supra note 76, at 1020.
78

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

79

Id. at 65-66.

80

527 U.S. at 136.

81

See Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 399 (1995).

82

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

83

Id.

84

See supra Part II.B.2.

85

Id.
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Scalia opined in his concurrence in Lilly, “Such an approach not only departs from
an original understanding of the Confrontation Clause but also freezes our
jurisprudence by making trial court decisions excluding such statements virtually
unreviewable.”86
In addition, fundamental fairness dictates that an accomplice’s confession that
meets the requirements of Rule 804(b)(3), and is thus genuinely self-inculpatory,
should be admissible if the declarant truly is unavailable. For example, in the
hypothetical posited at the beginning of the Article, the accomplice was Mirandized,
waived his right to an attorney, and then voluntarily confessed to the crimes,
implicitly implicating the defendant. The accomplice then dies. The authorities did
everything right - there was no coercion, no leniency offered, and no violation of any
of the accomplice’s constitutional rights. In fact, there was nothing more the
authorities could have done to preserve the evidence. There is no question these
statements have probative value. To exclude such probative statements flies in the
face of the Confrontation Clause, given that the Confrontation Clause has as a basic
purpose the promotion of the “‘integrity of the fact-finding process.’”87
Usually, a declarant is unavailable to testify against a defendant because invokes
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination knowing the statement
inculpates himself. But where the declarant has died, the prosecution is offering the
confession because there is no other possible way to call the declarant to the stand
and testify. The fact-finding process is best promoted by the admission of truly selfinculpatory statements against penal interest, which Rule 804(b)(3) requires, as a
firmly rooted hearsay exception under the Confrontation Clause.
III. CONCLUSION
Statements against penal interest that inculpate an accused should be admitted as
a firmly rooted hearsay exception under the Confrontation Clause. Federal Rule
804(b)(3) has longstanding judicial and legislative experience. The exception has
been around for twenty-five years, is codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
has been widely accepted in approximately four-fifths of the States.
Moreover, the core concern of admitting hearsay statements into evidence
without cross-examination rests upon the inherent reliability of the statements.
Hearsay statements that meet the requirements of Rule 804(b)(3), and thus are truly
against the declarant’s penal interest, are reliable. The question is whether the
statement was sufficiently against the declarant’s interest when made.88 Truly selfinculpatory statements will always be against the declarant’s interest. These are the
types of statements Congress intended to admit as reliable under Rule 804(b)(3), and
thus should be admissible as a firmly rooted hearsay exception under the
Confrontation Clause.
In contrast, non-self-inculpatory statements, as in Lilly, will never be against the
declarant’s interest because they shift blame. As the Court in Lilly was correct in
finding a Confrontation Clause violation, the plurality did more harm than good

86

527 U.S. at 144.

87

White, 502 U.S. at 356-57 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) and quoting
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987)).
88

Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603-04 (1994).
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when it banned all “confession[s] by an accomplice which incriminat[e] a criminal
defendant” from being a firmly rooted hearsay exception.
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